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Sentencing Enhancement and the
Crime Victim’s Brain
Francis X. Shen*
Criminal offenders who inflict serious bodily injury to another in the
course of criminal conduct are typically sentenced more harshly than
those who do not cause such injuries. But what if the harm caused is
“mental” or “psychological” and not “physical”? Should the
sentencing enhancement still apply? Federal and state courts are
already wrestling with this issue, and modern neuroscience offers new
challenges to courts’ analyses. This Article thus tackles the question: In
light of current neuroscientific knowledge, when and how should
sentencing enhancements for bodily injury include mental injuries?
The Article argues that classification of “mental” as wholly distinct
from “physical” is problematic in light of modern neuroscientific
understanding of the relationship between mind and brain. There is no
successful justification for treating mental injuries as categorically
distinct from other physical injuries. There is, however, good reason
for law to treat mental injuries as a unique type of physical injury.
Enhancement of criminal penalties for mental injuries must pay special
care to the causal connection between the offender’s act and the
victim’s injury. Moreover, it is law, not science, that must be the
ultimate arbiter of what constitutes a sufficiently bad mental harm to
justify a harsher criminal sentence, and of what evidence is sufficient to
prove the mental injury.
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INTRODUCTION
Sentencing enhancements are factors that can lead to more severe
punishment for an offender. One of the most common enhancements is
a penalty for the infliction of serious bodily injury to another in the
course of criminal conduct. The justification is straightforward:
offenders who cause more significant harm to others ought to be treated
more harshly than those who do not.
But what if the harm caused is “mental” or “psychological” and not
“physical”? Should the sentencing enhancement still apply? Federal
and state courts already wrestle with this issue, and modern
neuroscience offers new challenges to courts’ analyses. This Article
thus tackles the question: In light of current neuroscientific knowledge,
when and how should sentencing enhancements for bodily injury
include mental injuries?
The Article argues that classification of “mental” harms as wholly
distinct from “physical” harms is problematic in light of modern
neuroscientific understanding of the relationship between mind and
brain. There is no successful justification for treating mental injuries as
categorically distinct from other physical injuries. To do so would be to
perpetuate an archaic dualist view of the mind that few, if any, studying
the brain would endorse.
There is, however, good reason for law to treat mental injuries as a
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unique type of physical injury. Specifically, I argue that enhancement
of criminal penalties for mental injuries must pay special attention to the
(perhaps tenuous) causal connection between the offender’s act and the
victim’s injury. Moreover, I argue that it is law, not science, that must
be the ultimate arbiter of what constitutes a serious enough mental harm
to justify a harsher criminal sentence, and of what evidence is sufficient
to prove the injury.
Determining when and how much to punish offenders requires
consideration of the harms inflicted or intended. To the extent that
neuroscience better illuminates—and eventually can measure those
harms more accurately—it can contribute to more precise, just, and
evidence-based enhancements for harms to others. Increased attention
to the crime victim’s brain can enable improvements to criminal
sentencing enhancement.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces some of the
ways in which a bodily injury determination affects criminal sentencing
enhancements. Part II presents the current scientific consensus that
substance dualism is no longer a tenable theory, but also argues that the
mind-brain relationship remains poorly understood. Part III proposes a
way forward, noting a series of issues to consider. Part IV offers a short
discussion of the need for neurolaw scholarship that more carefully
examines the crime victim’s brain.
I. BODILY INJURY AND SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT
The concept of bodily injury, as distinct from “mental” or
“psychological” injury, is pervasive in law. 1 In criminal sentencing
1. Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2036, 2044 (2013).
As discussed in the Appendix to Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, many of the contexts in
which the bodily injury question is litigated have been civil. See e.g., Dov Fox & Alex Stein,
Dualism and Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing how a mind-body dualism
approach informs the doctrines of harm, compulsion, and intentionality while arguing against this
approach); Brian D. Shannon, The Brain Gets Sick, Too—the Case for Equal Insurance Coverage
for Serious Mental Illness, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 365, 366 (1993) (exploring the practices of
insurance companies with respect to mental illnesses as well as the judicial and legislative
response); Stacey A. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal: Reforming Federal Mental
Health Insurance Law, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2012) [hereinafter Tovino, All Illnesses Are
(Not) Created Equal] (proposing reform of federal health insurance law by removing statutory
and regulatory provisions that allow for unequal physical and mental health insurance benefits);
Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative Approach?, 42 AKRON L. REV.
469, 489 (2009) (discussing differences between mental and physical conditions in health
insurance plans); Alan Palmer Jacobus, The Bodily Injury Concept in Liability Policies Revisited,
30 Years On, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/2013_insurance_coveragelitigationcommittee/p_1_bodily
_injury_concept.authcheckdam.pdf (describing the concept of “bodily injury” in insurance
coverage litigations).
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specifically, courts are faced with the challenge of determining what
constitutes “bodily” injury, or serious/great/substantial “bodily” injury,
for the purpose of sentencing enhancement. 2
To understand how courts address such questions, it is useful to begin
with the recognition that two distinct elements must be met to determine
that a given injury is a serious bodily injury. First, the injury must be
“serious,” as opposed to non-serious. Second, the injury must be
“bodily,” as opposed to non-bodily. Consider these two factors in a
two-by-two typology, as I do in Table 1, leaves us with four possible
types of injury, only one of which will produce a criminal sentencing
enhancement for serious bodily injury:
1. A serious bodily injury is both serious and bodily. Only this type
of injury can result in a serious bodily injury sentencing
enhancement. See quadrant 1 in Table 1.
2. A serious non-bodily injury is distinguishable from #1 because,
although serious, it is not deemed an injury to the body. See
quadrant 2 in Table 1.
3. A non-serious bodily injury is distinguishable from #1 because,
although affecting the body, the harm is not deemed sufficiently
bad. See quadrant 3 in Table 1.
4.A non-serious, non-bodily injury is distinguishable from #1
because it is neither a serious injury nor an injury to the body. See
quadrant 4 in Table 1.

2. Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Sufficiency of Bodily Injury to Support Charge of
Aggravated Assault, 5 A.L.R.5th 243, § 2[a] (1992); see, e.g., Robert A. Mikos, “Eggshell”
Victims, Private Precautions, and the Societal Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 MICH. L. REV. 307,
333 (2006) (arguing that the law is “less precise when it comes to grading and punishing an
offense according to the degree of psychological harm inflicted (though the law clearly does take
such harm into consideration).”); Richard C. Valuntas, Is That a Serious Bodily Injury? Analysis
of Forced Blood Draws Under F.S. § 316.1933(1), FLA. B.J., June 2003, at 84, 84 (discussing
whether the forced drawing of blood is serious bodily injury); Y. F. Chiang, Annotation, What Is
“Harm” within Provisions of Statutes Increasing Penalty for Kidnapping Where Victim Suffers
Harm, 11 A.L.R.3d 1053, §2[a] (1967) (discussing the nature and severity of injury). Courts
have had to determine whether the transmission of HIV/AIDS and pregnancy resulting from rape
constitute bodily injury. See, e.g., People v. Cross, 190 P.3d 706, 708–09 (Cal. 2008)
(determining whether a pregnancy and subsequent abortion is serious bodily injury); Alan
Stephens, Annotation, Transmission or Risk of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) or Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) As Basis for Prosecution or Sentencing in
Criminal or Military Discipline Case, 13 A.L.R.5th 628, §§ 5–10 (1993) (analyzing cases that
determine whether prosecution is properly based on defendants’ contraction of HIV/AIDS). For
analysis of this issue, see generally Khiara M. Bridges, When Pregnancy Is an Injury: Rape, Law,
and Culture, 65 STAN. L. REV. 457 (2013); Sabrina Bonanno, Comment, Pregnancy As a Result
of Unlawful but Non-Forcible Sexual Conduct Is Not a Form of Great Bodily Injury, 44 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 193 (2009); Lauren Hoyson, Note, Rape Is Tough Enough Without Having
Someone Kick You from the Inside: The Case for Including Pregnancy As Substantial Bodily
Injury, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 565 (2010).
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My chief concern in this Article is the distinction between types
#1 and #2: by what criteria is an injury deemed to be a bodily injury?
To be sure, however, it is also vexing to know the difference between
#1 and #3: when is a change in the victim’s body is sufficient to
constitute the requisite level of severity intended by the statute—for
instance, was the injury “serious,” “great,” or “substantial”? 3
Table 1. A Typology of Injury
Quadrant 1:
Serious bodily injury

Quadrant 2:
Serious non-bodily injury

Explanation: The injury is deemed
both serious and bodily. The
criminal sentencing enhancement
may apply.
Example: Victim has a broken leg.

Quadrant 3:
Non-serious bodily injury

Explanation: The injury is deemed
serious, but not a bodily injury.
The
criminal
sentencing
enhancement may not apply.
Example: Caudillo, Garcia hold
that serious mental injury is not
“bodily”.
Quadrant 4:
Non-serious, non-bodily injury

Explanation: The injury is deemed
bodily, but non-serious.
The
criminal sentencing enhancement
may not apply.
Example: Victim has a minor
scratch that heals quickly.

Explanation: The injury is deemed
neither bodily, nor serious. The
criminal sentencing enhancement
may not apply.
Example: Victim has very
minimal economic loss.

Because it is only in Quadrant 1 where a stiffer penalty will be
recommended or required, the pertinent question is: When should a
victim’s harm be placed in Quadrant 1? Between Quadrants 1 and 3,
the distinction is purely one of severity. For instance, when does a
bruise or swelling constitute a substantial bodily injury? 4 These can be
difficult determinations, but seem similar to the difficult line drawing
inherent in so many areas of the law.

3. In instances where the enhancement applies if bodily injury is inflicted, the question
becomes whether there was an “injury.”
4. For a discussion of this issue, see State v. Clark, 772 P.2d 263, 266–67 (Idaho Ct. App.
1989); State v. Whaley, 389 N.W.2d 919, 926 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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The line between Quadrants 1 and 2, however, invites a more
fundamental, conceptual consideration: What do we mean when we use
the word “bodily” or “physical”? I address this question throughout this
Article, but first let us see why sentencing practice requires such a
determination.
In the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), and in
many state guidelines and statutes, the recommended sentences for
offenders are more severe when they cause some requisite amount of
bodily injury to another human in the course of their crime. In the
Guidelines, for instance, such enhancements apply for minor assault, 5
aggravated assault, 6 stalking, or domestic violence, 7 and kidnapping,
abduction, and unlawful restraint. 8
In these, and in many other instances, the Guidelines advise stiffer
penalties for offenders who inflict bodily injury upon another person.9
The magnitude of this increased penalty is potentially quite great. For
instance, the Guidelines recommend a sentence of fifteen to twenty-one
months for aggravated assault (for an offender with no criminal

5. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A2.3(b)(1) (2013)
[hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL]. The base offense level is four, but “[i]f
(A) the victim sustained bodily injury, increase by 2 levels; or (B) the offense resulted in
substantial bodily injury to an individual under the age of sixteen years, increase by 4 levels.” Id.
6. Id. § 2A2.2. The base offense level of Aggravated Assault is fourteen, id. § 2A2.2(a), but
“[i]f the victim sustained bodily injury, increase the offense level according to the seriousness of
the injury,” with bodily injury adding three levels, serious bodily injury adding five, and
permanent or life-threatening bodily injury adding seven. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(3). There are even
allowances for more fine-combed gradations. The Guidelines instruct that if the injury is more
than bodily injury but less than serious bodily injury, then the sentencing judge must add four
levels. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(D). The Guidelines also instruct that if the degree of injury is greater
than serious bodily injury, but not life threatening, then the sentencing judge must add six levels.
Id. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(E).
7. Id. § 2A6.2. The base offense level is eighteen, but if the offense involved “bodily injury”
there is an increase of two levels. Id. § 2A6.2(b)(1). This is one of several aggravating factors:
If the offense involved one of the following aggravating factors: (A) the violation of a
court protection order; (B) bodily injury; (C) possession, or threatened use, of a
dangerous weapon; or (D) a pattern of activity involving stalking, threatening,
harassing, or assaulting the same victim, increase by 2 levels. If the offense involved
more than one of these aggravating factors, increase by 4 levels.
Id.
8. Id. § 2A4.1. The base offense level is thirty-two, id. § 2A4.1(a), but there is (A) an increase
of four levels if “the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury,” or (B) an
increase of two levels if “the victim sustained serious bodily injury;” and “if the degree of injury
is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B)” an increase of three levels. Id. §
2A4.1(b)(2).
9. This type of enhancement emerges from the goal of the United States Sentencing
Commission to achieve “proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes
appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.” Id. ch. 1, subpt.
A1.3.
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history). 10 A bodily injury enhancement pushes that range to twentyone to twenty-seven months, and a serious bodily injury enhancement
all the way to thirty to thirty-seven months. 11 Whiles judges can depart
from the recommended range, the range is likely to affect the sentence
and thus the bodily injury determination can play a great role in the
assignment of the sentence. 12 Because sentencing can be affected by
whether a victim’s harms are considered “bodily,” then it is important to
know what harms will (and will not) be included in this category. 13

10. See id. ch. 5, pt. A at 395 tbl. The Guidelines include a “Sentencing Table” that
recommends a sentencing range (in months) based on previous criminal history and “offense
level.” Separate provisions of the Guidelines assign an offense level for particular offenses, and
enhancements can increase the offense level. Once the offense level is determined, that can be
combined with the individual’s criminal history to arrive at the recommended sentence.
11. Id.
12. Although they at times employ different nomenclature, many states—either through a
system of sentencing guidelines or through particular state statutes prescribing penalties for
particular types of offenses—employ a similar logic to the Federal Guidelines. In Minnesota, for
instance, severity levels for numerous offenses are increased if there is infliction of great or
substantial bodily harm. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines state that: “[t]he severity of the
sanction should increase in direct proportion to an increase in offense severity or the convicted
felon’s criminal history, or both.” MINN. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES & COMMENTARY § 1(A)(2) (2013). Examples for bodily harm enhancements
include enhancements for Malicious Punishment of Child, False Imprisonment, Criminal Abuse
of Vulnerable Adult, and many others. See id. § 5(A). In addition, there are other ways in which
the victim’s brain is indirectly accounted for through aggravating factors. Aggravating factors in
Minnesota include: “(1) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or reduced
physical or mental capacity, and the offender knew or should have known of this vulnerability.
(2) The victim was treated with particular cruelty for which the individual offender should be held
responsible.” Id. § 2(D)(3)(b).
13. It is beyond the scope of my considerations here, but another, indirect, means by which the
victim’s psychological harms can impact sentencing is through the emotions it invokes in the
decision-maker rendering the sentence. There is a sizeable empirical literature on the effects of
victim impact statements on sentencing, and a sizeable normative literature on whether such
statements should be included. For a review, e.g., Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact
Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 433–37 (2003)
(summarizing empirical results, and presenting results of an original experiment, on the effects of
victim impact statements on sentencing); see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting
and Capital Sentencing: Reducing the Effect of Victim Impact Statements, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
107, 124 (2009) (reporting the results of two experiments suggesting that victim impact
statements increase the imposition of capital sentences because of a perception of prolonged
emotional harm). But see Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 611, 634–36 (2009) (presenting empirical evidence that victim impact statements do not
affect sentence severity in either capital or non-capital cases); Julian V. Roberts, Listening to the
Crime Victim: Evaluating Victim Input at Sentencing and Parole, 38 CRIME & JUST. 347, 373–75
(2009) (concluding that there is no aggregate effect on sentencing from victim impact
statements). On the normative questions, see, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and
Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 390–410 (1996) (applying normative analysis
to conclude that victim impact statements should be suppressed); John H. Blume, Ten Years of
Payne: Victim Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 280–81 (2003)
(discussing how victim impact statements may allow for racial bias to influence sentencing);
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A. What Injuries Are Considered “Bodily”?
On May 2, 1975, Daniel Caudillo forcibly kidnapped and raped a
young woman in California.14 He was subsequently found guilty of a
series of offenses, including kidnapping, forcible rape, and first-degree
robbery. 15 On appeal, Mr. Caudillo argued, amongst other things, that:
“the evidence showing that he raped the victim twice, sodomized her
and compelled her several times to orally copulate him [was]
insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he inflicted ‘great bodily
injury’ upon the victim.” 16 Whether or not he inflicted great bodily
injury would determine whether his sentence would be enhanced under
the first-degree robbery statute. 17 The logic of the argument was, in
effect: there might have been great injury, but it was not great bodily
injury.
The California Supreme Court was persuaded. Writing en banc, the
court held that the phrase “great bodily injury” required a showing of
“significant or substantial physical injury” and further observed, “we
are aware of no principle of statutory interpretation that would permit
the legislative language—great bodily injury—to be construed as
including a rape victim’s psychological and emotional trauma.” 18
Many in the California legislature were not pleased with the Caudillo
decision. One particular newspaper article captured the sentiment well
with its observation: “[r]ape committed in the course of burglary gets
the assailant a lighter sentence under California law than if he broke the
arm of his victim.” 19 The California legislature subsequently amended
Jonathan H. Levy, Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument After Payne v.
Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1993) (discussing the constitutional limitations to
victim impact statements and proposing a two-prong test for victim impact statement
admissibility).
14. People v. Caudillo, 580 P.2d 274, 276 (Cal. 1978) (en banc). Caudillo was overruled by
People v. Martinez, 973 P.2d 512, 535 (Cal. 1999). However, Martinez was superseded by
statute in a later California case, People v. Robertson, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66 (Ct. App. 2012).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 281.
17. As described in a footnote by the Caudillo court:
At the date of the offenses involved herein, Penal Code section 461 provided . . .
[that] . . . in any case in which defendant committed burglary and in the course of
commission of the burglary, with the intent to inflict such injury, inflicted great bodily
injury on any occupant of the premises burglarized, such fact shall be charged in the
indictment or information and if found to be true by the jury, upon a jury trial, or if
found to be true by the court, upon a court trial, or if admitted by the defendant,
defendant shall suffer confinement in the state prison from 15 years to life.
Id. at 281 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Id. at 286.
19. Rape Penalties Less: Legislature May Stiffen Laws to Help Protect Women, LODI NEWSSENTINEL, July 29, 1978, at 5.
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the relevant statutes to define rape and forcible sodomy as great bodily
injuries. 20
In an Arizona case similar to Caudillo, State v. Garcia, four young
men were convicted of sexual assault and aggravated assault of a
twenty-one-year-old college student. 21 The victim was walking home
from a bus stop when the defendants offered her a ride and subsequently
raped her. 22 Eventually, she was able to escape. 23 After their
conviction, the defendants appealed the charge of aggravated assault. 24
In Arizona, to be guilty of aggravated assault, the defendants must
have caused “serious physical injury.” The statutory definition of
serious physical injury read at the time: “‘Serious physical injury’
includes physical injury that creates a reasonable risk of death, or that
causes serious and permanent disfigurement, serious impairment of
health or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily
organ or limb.” 25 Employing this definition, the court ruled that the
victim had not experienced serious physical injury. Instead, it held:
At trial, the state argued that the victim received a serious physical
injury within the meaning of the statute because her mental or
emotional health was seriously impaired. The evidence does show
that the experience was emotionally traumatic for her. However, the
plain meaning of the statute does not include injuries which are solely
mental or emotional.
While “health” in the phrase “serious
impairment of health,” § 13–105(29), might be defined to include
mental or emotional health, when read in conjunction with § 13–
105(24), it is clear that the legislature intended to limit the statute to
impairments of physical health. See also State v. Rossier, 175 Conn.
204, 397 A.2d 110 (1978), where the Connecticut Supreme Court
refused to find a serious physical injury under a similar statute where
the assault victim’s injuries consisted primarily of emotional trauma. 26

Caudillo and Garcia usefully illustrate what can result when mental
injuries are categorically excluded from the bodily injury category.

20. JACQUELINE R. BRAITMAN & GERALD F. UELMEN, JUSTICE STANLEY MOSK: A LIFE AT
CENTER OF CALIFORNIA POLITICS AND JUSTICE 192–93 (2013). The Law and Order
Campaign Committee used Caudillo to challenge Chief Justice Bird’s re-election. Id.
21. State v. Garcia, 673 P.2d 955, 957 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 958.
26. Garcia, 673 P.2d at 958. Other state courts also arrived at the same conclusion in similar
cases in this earlier era. E.g., State v. Rossier, 397 A.2d 110, 112 (1978) (“[T]he evidence of
physical injury—which consisted primarily of testimony relating to emotional trauma precipitated
by the incident—was simply not sufficient to support the jury’s implicit conclusion that the
physical injury sustained by [the victim] was ‘serious’ under the statutory definition.”).
THE
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B. Statutory Definitions
One way by which legislatures have tried to address the scope of the
term “bodily” in bodily injury is by crafting a legal definition. Yet—as
I have shown in previous work—wording and interpretations of those
definitions vary widely. 27 Court interpretations of bodily injury
provisions have at times relied upon (mistaken) assumptions about what
lay understanding of the term means. 28 Contemporary lay views about
the concept of bodily injury, as distinct from mental injury, are
contested and in flux. For instance, my study found that when lay
subjects were asked to categorize Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(“PTSD”) by injury type, the subjects were split: 27% thought PTSD is
probably or definitely bodily injury, 25% chose maybe, 25% chose
probably not, and 22% chose definitely not. 29
Some policymakers have attempted to explicitly broaden the
definition of what constitutes great or serious bodily injury. For
instance, in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, “serious bodily injury”
is defined as follows:
“Serious bodily injury” means injury involving extreme physical pain
or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ,
or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery,
hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation. In addition, “serious bodily
injury” is deemed to have occurred if the offense involved conduct
constituting criminal sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2242
or any similar offense under state law. 30

The inclusion of “mental faculty” allows for emotional injury (if
sufficiently severe) to produce the enhanced penalty. 31 And, as the
27. I examined the bodily injury definitions of all fifty states previously. Shen, supra note 1,
at 2121–58 tbl.A2.
28. Id. at 2101.
29. Id. at 2041.
30. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(L).
31. An example is United States v. Knott, No. 98-41462, 1999 WL 707866, at *1 (5th Cir.
1999) (per curiam). In Knott, a defendant was convicted of robbing the local post office, and in
the course of the robbery assaulting the postmaster. Id. The presentence report assigned the
defendant a four-level enhancement on the grounds that the victim postmaster experienced
serious bodily injury. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the postmaster was not seriously
injured. Id. The appellate court found that:
It is not controverted that following the robbery, the postal employee (1) suffered from
nightmares and panic and anxiety attacks; (2) was taking anti-depressants; (3) was
receiving mental health counseling; and (4) was unable to return to work. The
employee was ultimately diagnosed as suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) and her prognosis was “guarded.”
Id. On these facts, and relying on United States v. Reed, 26 F.3d 523, 530–31 (5th Cir.1994)
(holding that post traumatic stress disorder could be a “serious bodily injury” for purposes of §
2B3.1(b)(3)(B)), the appellate court affirmed the enhancement. Id.; see United States v. Spinelli,
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“deeming” provision in the definition provides, in some instances this
severity will simply be deemed to have occurred. 32
C. Enhancement for Extreme Psychological Injury
In addition to the inclusion of “mental faculty” within the definition
of serious bodily injury, the Guidelines allow for an upward departure
when “a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more
serious than that normally resulting from commission of the offense.” 33
An illustration of an application of this provision comes from a 2001
fraud case, United States v. Jarvis, involving John Jarvis, a financial
fraud artist whose clients lost $880,000. 34
Jarvis participated in two fraudulent investment schemes, and his
victims included several retirees, whose entire life savings were lost.35
The sentencing judge justified a harsher sentence in part on the grounds
that the offender had caused extreme psychological injury to his
victims. 36 The sentence was affirmed on appeal, and the appellate court
352 F.3d 48, 57 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[E]motional injury can result in ‘loss or substantial impairment
of the function of a . . . mental faculty’ that is sufficient to warrant a four-level enhancement.”);
United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 1998) (concluding that a victim’s impairment of
mental faculties constituted a serious bodily injury).
32. The deeming provision, however, is not straightforward. In the commentary to the federal
guideline just quoted, it is noted that “for purposes of this guideline, ‘serious bodily injury’ means
conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which already is taken into account in the base offense
level.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2A3.1 cmt. n.1. It is unclear
what the “conduct” of the base level offense—criminal sexual abuse—is. For instance, consider
an offender who holds down his victim, forces vaginal intercourse, and then walks away. What
if, as a result of that forced intercourse, there is permanent damage of the victim’s reproductive
organs? The commentary suggests that—despite the devastating, life-changing consequences—
such damage would not warrant a sentencing enhancement (because the offender’s conduct was
solely the actus reus of the criminal sexual abuse). Indeed, in United States v. Guy, the Eighth
Circuit found that “[b]ecause the Commission placed this exclusion in the commentary to §
2A3.1, the deeming provision in Application Note 1(j) cannot be used to enhance a sentence for
criminal sexual abuse.” 282 F.3d 991, 996 (8th Cir. 2002).
33. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 5K2.3. The Guidelines
continue:
The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the severity of the
psychological injury and the extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly
risked. Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently severe to warrant
application of this adjustment only when there is a substantial impairment of the
intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral functioning of a victim, when the
impairment is likely to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when the
impairment manifests itself by physical or psychological symptoms or by changes in
behavior patterns. The court should consider the extent to which such harm was likely,
given the nature of the defendant’s conduct.
Id.
34. United States v. Jarvis, 258 F.3d 235, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2001).
35. Id. at 237–38.
36. Id. at 237. In this case, the judge also relied on a provision, in effect at the time, relating
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quoted extensively from the sentencing judge’s discussion of the
psychological harm caused by the fraud scheme. It stated:
[D]efendant’s victims include blue collar workers who had worked
hard and saved many years to be able to enjoy their retirement. . . .
Due to the defendant’s conduct, many of his victims will be forced to
live their retirement years in destitution. Defendant has taken away
the security and comforts that his victims’ lifetime of hard work would
have otherwise provided them. Defendant intentionally took money
from people whom he knew to be of or near advanced age and who
were uneducated investors, convincing them to hand over their entire
life savings and retirement funds.
Defendant’s actions resulted in foreseeable psychological harm,
severe emotional trauma, and involved the knowing endangerment of
the solvency of one or more of his victims.
Mr. and Mrs. Nathan Hager are currently on depression medication
and see a mental health professional in order to deal with their
losses. . . .
There is a distinction between defrauding a thirty-year old of his
life savings and defrauding a sixty-year old of his life savings.
Defendant could foresee the unlikelihood of his victims recouping
their loss. . . .
In over twenty years as a judge on the bench, this is one of the most
egregious cases of fraud that this Court has seen. . . .
While the victim of any fraud would certainly experience
emotional distress upon the realization that their money was gone, the
psychological harm caused by defendant was much more serious than
that which would normally be experienced by a fraud victim. To steal
the means by which persons worked to support themselves in their
retirement years, to take the money that an elderly couple realized at
the sale of their largest asset, the family home, to take a couple’s
savings at the same time they are forced to bury their only child, to
take an elderly woman’s savings meant to secure a funeral for her
disabled son, subjected the defendant’s victims to psychological injury
which exceeds that which could be expected in a run of the mill fraud
case. 37

The appellate court agreed that “‘Jarvis’ fraudulent scheme caused
several victims to suffer severe emotional trauma sufficient to justify an
upward departure for conduct outside the heartland of the fraud

specifically to fraud cases: “[s]pecifically mentioned as factors outside the heartland of the fraud
guideline are ‘reasonably foreseeable . . . psychological harm or severe emotional trauma’ and the
‘knowing endangerment of the solvency of one or more victims.’” Id. at 239 (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 5, § 2F1.1 cmt. n.11(c), n.11(f) (deleted)).
37. Id. at 240–41 (alteration in original).
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sentencing guideline.” 38 The Jarvis case is an example of how
emotional harms can be directly linked to a sentencing enhancement.
The Caudillo and Garcia rape cases and the Jarvis fraud case
usefully illustrate the core concern of this Article: When, and under
what circumstances, should psychological harms to crime victims play a
role in sentencing an offender? To answer this question, we should
think first about the question: Is “mental” stuff distinct from “physical”
stuff? The next Part addresses this question.
II. THE DEATH OF DUALISM & LAW’S HARD PROBLEM
For centuries, thinkers have debated the relationship between mind
and body, a relationship known in academic circles as the “mind-body”
problem. 39 The theory that “mental” substance is something wholly
different from “bodily” substance is known as “substance dualism,”
because it posits that there are dual types of substances in the
universe. 40 The French mathematician and philosopher René Descartes
famously made the case for substance dualism, also known as
“Cartesian dualism.” 41 Descartes’s theory was held in high regard for
many years.
Today, however, this is no longer the case. To see how far substance
dualism has fallen, one can simply open an introductory psychology
textbook. One example is Introduction to Psychology, a widely adopted
38. Id. at 241.
39. See JAAK PANKSEPP, AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN AND
ANIMAL EMOTIONS 336 app. C (1998) (“The dilemma this debate embodies is as old as our
ability to speak . . . .”); WILLIAM R. UTTAL, DUALISM: THE ORIGINAL SIN OF COGNITIVISM 246–
56 (2004) (discussing the history of modern dualism, its influence on philosophy, psychology,
and the mind-body problem).
40. The form of dualism I discuss here, Cartesian dualism, is one of several types of dualism.
“Property dualism,” advanced by some philosophers, holds that mental properties and physical
properties are not the same. See Michael Pauen, Painless Pain: Property Dualism and the Causal
Role of Phenomenal Consciousness, 37 AM. PHIL. Q. 51, 51 (2001) (“[A] distinction between
mental and neural properties can be made without a commitment to substance- or event-dualism.
These properties may be instantiated by one single physical event and the distinction between
them can be maintained even if it turns out that there are strict correlations between certain
mental and neural properties.”). My concern in this Article is not whether a distinction can be
made between mental and physical (indeed I argue later that they can and should be
distinguished), but whether that distinction can be sustained on Cartesian dualist grounds.
41. See MARLEEN ROZEMOND, DESCARTES’S DUALISM 1 (1998) (“Most interpreters believe
that the claim that mind can exist unextended or the claim that it can exist without body is central
to this argument, and many equate Cartesian dualism with these claims.”). In this Article, I refer
to substance dualism and Cartesian dualism to mean the same thing, but philosophers of mind
draw a finer distinction. “Substance dualism is also often dubbed ‘Cartesian dualism’, but some
substance dualists are keen to distinguish their theories from Descartes’s.” Howard Robinson,
Dualism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL § 2.3 (2012), available at http://stanford.library.usyd.edu.
au/entries/dualism/.
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textbook now in its tenth printing that is frequently used in Advanced
Placement Psychology classes. In the very first module of the textbook,
students learn about the “the mind-brain problem.” 42 Here’s what they
are told:
Given that we live in a universe of matter and energy, what, if
anything, is the mind? And why does consciousness exist? The
philosophical question of how experience relates to the brain is the
mind-brain problem (or mind-body problem). One view, called
dualism, holds that the mind is separate from the brain but somehow
controls the brain and therefore the rest of the body. However,
dualism contradicts the law of conservation of matter and energy, one
of the cornerstones of physics. . . . If the mind isn’t composed of
matter or energy, it can’t do anything. For that reason, nearly all brain
researchers and philosophers favor monism, the view that conscious
experience is inseparable from the physical brain. That is, mental
activity is brain activity. 43

The textbook’s author, psychologist James Kalat, goes on, in the next
paragraph, to discuss Positron-Emission Tomography scan (“PET
scan”) images of a human brain (with an accompanying graphic with
illustrative PET scan images). The author also writes: “[y]ou might ask:
Did the brain activity cause the thoughts, or did the thoughts cause the
brain activity? Most brain researchers reply, ‘Neither,’ because brain
activity and mental activity are the same thing.” 44
The view presented in Kalat’s introductory textbook accurately
reflects the scientific consensus that dualism is no longer a viable
theory. Consider these snippets:
• “The modern science of mind proceeds on the assumption that the
mind is simply what the brain does. . . . We scientists take the
mind’s physical basis for granted.” – Neuroscientist Joshua
Greene 45

42. JAMES W. KALAT, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 5 (Linda Ganster et al. eds., 10th ed.
2014). The textbook is a mainstream book, and has been adopted in both advanced high school
courses and in introductory college courses. The author, psychologist James Kalat, served from
2007–2011 on the Advisory Panel for the American Psychological Association’s National
Standards for High School Psychology Curricula.
43. Id. at 5–6 (emphasis omitted).
44. Id. at 6. Kalat’s book is not an outlier in its coverage of brain science. Official guidance
from the College Board, the organization tasked with administering the advanced placement
(“AP”) tests that so many high school students take, suggests that AP Psychology should include
instruction on the biological bases of behavior. The College Board also suggests that AP
Psychology teachers “may wish to begin by investigating how researchers have studied the brain,
including current brain imaging techniques.” KRISTIN H. WHITLOCK, AP PSYCHOLOGY
TEACHER’S GUIDE 6 (2008).
45. Joshua D. Greene, Social Neuroscience and the Soul’s Last Stand, in SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND 263
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• “The idea of mind as distinct in this way from the brain, composed
not of ordinary matter but of some other, special kind of stuff, is
dualism, and it is deservedly in disrepute today . . . . [D]ualism is
to be avoided at all costs.” – Philosopher Daniel Dennett 46
• “[T]he theory that mind and brain are separable is untenable . . .”
– Neuroscientist David Redish 47
• “Dualistic views on human nature, often associated with Descartes,
rarely gain proponents among brain scientists.” – Neuroscientists
Jacek Debiec & Joseph E. LeDoux 48
• “[M]ost neuroscientists are not terribly interested in the old mindbody debates. Most thinkers are satisfied to believe that mind is
simply the brain in action . . . mind emerges as naturally from
brain functions as digestion emerges from normal gastric
processes.” – Neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp 49
• “Substance dualism is no longer considered a respectable
philosophical position today.” – Philosopher Neil Levy 50
• “[W]e must admit that dualism is dead.” – Professor of Law and
Biology Owen Jones 51

These quotations could go on for some time, but the point is clear: in the
scientific community, substance dualism has been thoroughly rejected.
This is not to say that the dualism conversation is entirely over. 52

(Alexander Todorov et al. eds., 2011). Greene argues that:
Officially, we scientists already know (or think we know) that dualism is false and that
we are simply complex biological machines. But insofar as we know this, we know
this in a thin, intellectual way. We haven’t seen the absence of the soul. Rather, we
have inferred its absence, based on the available evidence and our background
assumptions about what makes one scientific theory better than another. But to truly,
deeply believe that we are machines, we must see the clockwork in action. We’ve all
heard that the soul is dead. Now we want to see the body. This is what modern
neuroscience promises to deliver, and it is no small thing.
Id. at 264.
46. DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 33, 37 (1991).
47. A. DAVID REDISH, THE MIND WITHIN THE BRAIN 159 (2013).
48. Jacek Debiec & Joseph E. LeDoux, Conclusions: From Self-Knowledge to a Science of the
Self, 1001 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 305, 310 (2003).
49. PANKSEPP, supra note 39, at 336.
50. Neil Levy, Neuroethics and the Extended Mind, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
NEUROETHICS 285, 286 (Judy Illes & Barbara J. Sahakian eds., 2011).
51. Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral Biology, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 283, 289
(1999).
52. Some have argued that in fact there is an implicit, or covert dualism operating in the
analysis of many neuroscience studies. See M. R. BENNETT & P. M. S. HACKER, HISTORY OF
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 241 (2012) (“The greatest figures of the first two generations of
twentieth-century neuroscientists, e.g. Sherrington, Eccles and Penfield, were avowed Cartesian
dualists. The third generation retained the basic Cartesian structure, but transformed it into brainbody dualism: substance-dualism was abandoned, but structural dualism retained. For
neuroscientists now ascribe much the same array of mental predicates to the brain as Descartes
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For instance, in contrast to the scholarly consensus, much of the general
public retains a dualist view of the world. 53 Scholars also continue to
explore why we are intuitive dualists, why we behave like dualists, and
whether this is a problem. 54 In addition, despite a strong majority
rejecting the theory, Cartesian dualism still has some proponents.55
One of the last prominent brain scientists to enthusiastically defend
dualism was the late Nobel Laureate John Eccles, who, along with Karl
Popper, wrote The Self and Its Brain in 1977. 56 This view enjoyed
some support and in 2007 philosopher John Searle observed that
“dualism has gradually come to seem intellectually respectable
again.” 57 Searle wrote an essay to (once again) affirm dualism’s
“incoherence.” 58 Searle reaffirms the view—supported by a wide cast
ascribed to the mind, and conceive of the relationship between thought and action, and experience
and its objects, in much the same way as Descartes—essentially merely replacing the mind by the
brain. The central theme of our book was to demonstrate the incoherence of brain/body dualism,
and to disclose its misguided crypto-Cartesian character.”). While an interesting hypothesis, this
is beyond the scope of the present Article, and has little bearing on the central claim being made
here about sentencing enhancements. See, e.g., Yuri I. Arshavsky, “Scientific Roots” of Dualism
in Neuroscience, 79 PROGRESS IN NEUROBIOLOGY 190 (2006) (arguing that a “covert dualism” is
embraced by many in the neuroscience community).
53. See Athena Demertzi et al., Dualism Persists in the Science of Mind, 1157 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 1, 1 (2009) (“[S]urveys of highly educated samples have suggested that ‘dualistic’
attitudes toward the mind–brain relationship remain very common.”).
54. See PAUL BLOOM, DESCARTES’ BABY: HOW THE SCIENCE OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT
EXPLAINS WHAT MAKES US HUMAN xiii (2004) (arguing that “[b]abies are natural-born
dualists”); cf. MICHAEL GAZZANIGA, HUMAN: THE SCIENCE BEHIND WHAT MAKES US UNIQUE
246–75 (2008) (discussing why humans act like dualists).
55. E.g., Robinson, supra note 41, § 1.2 (“[A]lthough dualism has been out of fashion in
psychology since the advent of behaviourism (Watson 1913) and in philosophy since Ryle
(1949), the argument is by no means over. Some distinguished neurologists, such as Sherrington
(1940) and Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) have continued to defend dualism as the only theory
that can preserve the data of consciousness. Amongst mainstream philosophers, discontent with
physicalism led to a modest revival of property dualism in the last decade of the twentieth
century.”); see also Patricia Smith Churchland, The Significance of Neuroscience for Philosophy,
11 TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCE 304, 305 (1988) (“Notwithstanding its many difficulties,
predilection, if not argument, for dualism remains remarkably widespread.”).
56. KARL POPPER & JOHN ECCLES, THE SELF AND ITS BRAIN (1977).
57. John R. Searle, Dualism Revisited, 101 J. PHYSIOLOGY-PARIS 169, 170 (2007).
58. Id. Searle made clear that even if one rejects a reductionist account of consciousness, it is
still the case that “the reason that consciousness can function causally in a ‘physical’ world is that
it has physical properties. Every conscious state is realized in a certain physical structure in the
brain and has the conscious powers of all of these physical structures.” Id. at 176. Searle argues
that neither materialism nor dualism is tenable:
[C]onsciousness [is] causally reducible but not ontologically reducible to neuronal
processes. It is causally reducible, because there is nothing going on which cannot be
causally accounted for by neuronal processes. But the causal reduction does not lead
to an ontological reduction because consciousness has a first-person or subjective
ontology, and for that reason cannot be reduced to something that has a third-person or
objective ontology. If you try to make the reduction you leave something out, namely
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of brain researchers—that dualism is no longer a tenable theory. 59
A. Law’s Hard Problem
If substance dualism is dead, then how are we to understand the
relationship between mind and brain? The short answer is we don’t
know. At least not yet. There are, of course, many theories about how
mind and brain relate and scholars in neuroscience, philosophy, law,
and related disciplines are testing and revising those theories. 60 One
central debate is the extent to which mental states “reduce” entirely to
physical brain states. 61 Solving the mind-brain quandary is so difficult
the subjectivity of consciousness.
Id. at 175.
59. Id.
60. See generally BRAIN, MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE HISTORY OF NEUROSCIENCE (C.
U. M. Smith & Harry Whitaker eds., Springer 2014); PATRICIA S. CHURCHLAND, BRAIN-WISE:
STUDIES IN NEUROPHILOSOPHY (2002); PATRICIA CHURCHLAND, NEUROPHILOSOPHY: TOWARD
A UNIFIED SCIENCE OF THE MIND-BRAIN (1986); OWEN FLANAGAN, THE REALLY HARD
PROBLEM: MEANING IN A MATERIAL WORLD (2007); Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson,
Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211 (2010). Other
disciplines approach the question differently. See, e.g., TORIN ALTER & ROBERT J. HOWELL,
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A READER 1 (2012) (discussing several
different approaches that attempt to reconcile consciousness with physicalism); DENNETT, supra
note 46, at 431 (describing human consciousness as “a ‘virtual machine,’ a sort of evolved (and
evolving) computer program that shapes the activities of the brain”); JOSEPH LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC
SELF: HOW OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE 18 (2003) (footnote omitted) (“Neuroscientists,
by contrast, typically start with the assumption that the materialist view of the mind-body
problem is correct (that the mind is a product of the brain), and then try to understand how the
brain makes the mind possible.”); TOWARD A SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS III: THE THIRD
TUCSON DISCUSSIONS AND DEBATES (Stuart R. Hameroff et al. eds., 1999) (discussing various
theories of consciousness).
61. See Churchland, supra note 55, at 305 (“Since on balance physicalism appears to be more
probable than dualism, in the sense that mental phenomena are probably phenomena of the
physical brain, the traditional mind-body problem has been replaced by a different set of
problems posed within the physicalist framework.”); see also CONTEMPORARY DUALISM: A
DEFENSE 10–14 (Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson eds., 2014) (critiquing materialist
concepts of consciousness and advocating for various dualist alternatives). Some take the
position that neither dualism nor reductionist materialism are correct. Searle has eloquently
summarized this position:
Materialism says falsely that consciousness, as irreducible, qualitative subjectivity,
does not exist. Dualism says falsely that irreducible, subjective, qualitative phenomena
are something in addition to, something over and above, the real, physical world. Now
I think we can see how to say what is true in both without saying the false part. The
world does indeed consist of physical particles in fields of force (or whatever the
ultimate entities of the true physics turn out to be). But among the higher level features
of these, entirely caused by the behavior of the lower level elements, are consciousness
with its qualitative subjectivity. These are causally, but not ontologically, reducible to
the behavior of the neuronal substrates. But they are part of the ordinary physical
world like any other biological phenomenon.
Searle, supra note 58, at 178. Indeed, in a 2010 review article, psychologist Gregory Miller
argues that we should “avoid dualism” but also argues against naïve reductionism: “[i]n fact, we
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that it has been labeled “the hard problem of consciousness.” 62
While the hard problem for philosophy and neuroscience is
accurately specifying the relationship between mind and brain, the hard
problem for law is what to do while those other disciplines are sorting
everything out. That is, if everyone agrees that dualism it outmoded,
but no one yet agrees on what comes next, what can guide the law in its
conceptualization of mental and psychological phenomena? 63 The
potential consequences of a paradigm shift away from dualism have
been discussed in the context of health law 64 and tort law, 65 but have
generally been overlooked in the context of criminal sentencing. 66
My proposed way forward is to balance what is known and unknown
about the mind. On one hand, criminal sentencing ought to recognize
that mental and psychological injuries are injuries to the physical cells
that make up the brain. To reject dualism does not require that criminal
sentencing commit itself to any of the theories competing to replace it.67
know little about how or whether neural events drive psychological events, or the converse.”
Gregory A. Miller, Mistreating Psychology in the Decades of the Brain, 5 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL.
SCI. 716, 716 (citations omitted). Similarly, philosopher Alva Noë has labeled “Cartesian
neuroscience” as the position that “conscious experience is an exhaustively neural phenomenon”
and he argues that there is “no empirical support” for this position. ALVA NOË, OUT OF OUR
HEADS 173 (2009).
62. David J. Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, 2 J. CONSCIOUSNESS
STUD. 200, 201 (1995).
63. As earlier, I use the words “mental” and “psychological” interchangeably.
64. See Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 1, at 31 (footnote omitted)
(noting that courts have had “great difficulty” in deciding “whether a particular insured’s illness
is physical or mental”). She argues that the tests developed by courts are not adequate. Id. at 31–
32.
65. See generally Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of
Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 235 (2012).
66. Though see: Fox & Stein, supra note 1, at 17–18 (discussing the constitutional foundation
of dualism in criminal sentencing); cf. Shen supra note 1, at 2047 (recognizing the bodily injury
distinctions made in sentencing guidelines).
67. For instance, Pardo and Patterson state that “[t]he dichotomy between dualism and mindas-brain is a false one.” Pardo & Patterson, supra note 60, at 1216. Here, I do not argue that
criminal sentencing needs to embrace mind-as-brain. I simply argue that criminal sentencing
should reject substance dualism. On this, Pardo, Patterson, and I agree. They have written that:
Any claims based on substance dualism for treating mental disorders differently from
other physical disorders or for treating mental/ emotional injuries differently from
other physical injuries should be rejected. There may be good policy reasons for
drawing distinctions along these lines—for example, evidentiary considerations or
effects on primary (i.e., non-litigation) behavior, in other words, the usual reasons for
drawing doctrinal distinctions—but the fact that mental events are not physical events
should not be one of them.
Michael Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Response to Pustilnik, Shen, and Moriarty, NEUROETHICS &
L. BLOG (Mar. 28, 2014, 1:11 AM), http://kolber.typepad.com/ethics_law_blog/2014/03/
response-to-pustilnik-shen-and-moriarty-pardo-patterson.html.
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The question of whether sentencing enhancements are monist or dualist
does not require the resolution of the relative merits of mentalism or
some version of reductionism, materialism, physicalism, or
determinism. 68
On the other hand, criminal sentencing should also recognize that the
mind-brain relationship remains difficult to understand with precision.
An appreciation for the still mysterious complexities of the mind-brainbehavior relationship will help sentencing enhancement avoid what, in a
related context, legal scholar Stephen Morse has labeled
“neuroarrogance.” 69 Although Morse recognizes that “[t]here must be a
biological substrate in the brain for all human behaviour,” he argues
that, “given how little we know about the [mind-brain] and brain-action
connection, to claim based on neuroscience that we should radically
change our picture of ourselves and our practices is a form of
neuroarrogance.” 70 I agree. Criminal sentencing, if it is to embrace
enhancements for infliction of mental injuries, must recognize that we
do not yet understand exactly how mental disorders and psychological
harms are caused (nor how they can be effectively treated).
Remaining modest is also consistent with leading scientific views on
the present state of knowledge. Consider the views of Thomas Insel,
Director of the National Institute of Mental Health. Insel has argued
“that what we need conceptually to make progress here is to rethink
these [mental] disorders as brain disorders.” 71 But Insel also
emphasizes that we must not rely upon a simplistic notion of the mindbrain relationship: “when we talk about the brain, it is anything but
unidimensional or simplistic or reductionistic.” Insel describes the
brain as
[A]n organ of surreal complexity, and we are just beginning to
understand how to even study it, whether you’re thinking about the
100 billion neurons that are in the cortex or the 100 trillion synapses
that make up all the connections. We have just begun to try to figure
out how do we take this very complex machine that does extraordinary

68. See Peter B. Reiner, The Rise of Neuroessentialism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
NEUROETHICS 161, 162 (2011) (“There are serious scholars of the mind who heartily reject
dualism but nonetheless disagree with neuroessentialist thinking.” (citation omitted)).
69. Stephen J. Morse, Lost in Translation? An Essay on Law and Neuroscience, in 13 LAW
AND NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 529, 547 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010).
70. Id. at 549, 547.
71. Thomas Insel, Toward a New Understanding of Mental Illness, TED (Apr. 2013),
http://www.ted.com/talks/thomas_insel_toward_a_new_understanding_of_mental_illness/transcri
pt (emphasis added).
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kinds of information processing and use our own minds to understand
this very complex brain that supports our own minds. 72

While we surely have a long way to go, some progress has been
made.
Sixty years before Insel’s talk, Nobel Laureate and
neuropsychologist Roger Sperry observed that, “[a]ny immediate
attempt to relate brain processes to psychic experience appears rather
discouraging.” 73 Sperry, quoting Charles Sherrington (another Nobel
Laureate), wrote, “[w]e have to regard the relation of mind to brain as
not merely unsolved, but still devoid of a basis for its very
beginning.” 74 Nearly a century after Sherrington’s remarks, the
relationship of mind and brain remains unresolved. But we now at least
have a foundation for beginning to better understand it.
B. Evidence of Legal Change
How will courts and legislatures react to my proposal that, for
criminal sentencing, we include mental injuries as part of the bodily
injury category? Likely the response will: we’re already starting to do
just that. On the policy side, legal scholar Avlana Eisenberg has
recently shown that legislatures in the United States are increasingly
creating criminal statutes that impose liability for causing another
emotional harm. 75
There have also been many cases where sentences have been
enhanced due to victims’ mental injuries. 76 For example, in 1990, the
North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed a case, State v. Everhardt, in
which a woman’s ex-husband raped her and inserted multiple objects

72. Id.
73. R. W. Sperry, Neurology and the Mind-Brain Problem, 40 AM. SCIENTIST 291, 292
(1952).
74. Id. at 296. Sperry’s view in 1952 was that it was “not a solution we aspire to but only a
basis on which to begin.” Id.
75. Avlana K. Eisenberg, Criminal Infliction of Emotional Distress, 113 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript as of May 15, 2014) (on file with author). Eisenberg argues that
rather than “explicitly criminaliz[ing] the infliction of emotional distress,” we should instead
“identify conduct that causes severe emotional harm and . . . prohibit such behaviors explicitly.”
Id. (manuscript at 54). Eisenberg does not address sentencing enhancement directly, but perhaps
would be disappointed with the court’s emphasis on the victim’s psychological state rather than
the offender’s conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Dodson, 109 F.3d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Perkins, 89 F.3d 303, 308 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he enhancement for causing
‘bodily injury’ is premised upon a particular result, not the defendant’s conduct. It penalizes the
defendant based on the severity of the outcome . . . .”).
76. Indeed, courts have been increasing sentences for some time based on the emotional or
psychological harm caused by the offender. See, e.g., United States v. Rodgers, 122 F.3d 1129
(8th Cir. 1997); State v. Rousseau, 509 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1987); People v. Burton, 429 N.E.2d 543
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981); People v. Lloyd, 416 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Durham v. Indiana,
510 N.E.2d 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
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into her over the course of six nights. 77 The victim testified that, as a
result of the abuse, she “felt like [she] was the lowest person on the face
of the earth. [She] had no self-esteem, no confidence in [herself].”78
She was later hospitalized for severe depression, suicidal tendencies,
and anorexia. 79
The defendant appealed his conviction of assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury. 80 The issue on appeal was whether
“serious injury” could include mental injury. 81 The court found that
“[t]he assaults perpetrated on the victim were, in the main,
psychologically torturous in nature, calculated to inflict mental or
emotional injury rather than bodily injury.” 82
The court held that:
While it is possible to consider the injuries suffered by the victim in
light of the physical symptoms she suffered in conjunction with her
mental illness, as did the Court of Appeals, we instead hold that
serious injury, within the meaning and intent of that term as used in
N.C.G.S. § 14–32, includes serious mental injury caused by an assault
with a deadly weapon. 83

The court went on to write that, “[t]he compelling evidence of mental
injury presented in this case illustrates the observation that ‘the mind is
no less a part of the person than the body, and the sufferings of the
former are sometimes more acute and lasting than those of the latter.’” 84
Although it could have reached the same result another way, the court
directly addressed the problematic dualism animating the appellate
court’s decision. My suggestion is that more courts adopt a similar
approach. In so doing, courts should recognize the two dimensions of
the issue (as the North Carolina Supreme Court did). Just because a
mental injury is a bodily injury, it does not follow that it is necessarily a
serious bodily injury. Determining whether it is sufficiently harmful (in
this case whether it is “serious”) is a separate determination, to be made
based on the facts of each case. 85 Courts should also recognize a

77. State v. Everhardt, 392 S.E.2d 391, 391–92 (N.C. 1990).
78. Id. at 392.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–32(b) provides that “[a]ny person who assaults another person
with a deadly weapon and inflicts serious injury shall be punished as a Class E felon.” N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14–32(b) (2013).
82. Everhardt, 392 S.E.2d at 393.
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Young v. W. Union Tel. Co., 11 S.E. 1044, 1048 (1890) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
85. The North Carolina Supreme Court noted:
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variety of additional concerns, which I address in the next Part.
III. SENTENCING ENHANCEMENTS FOR MENTAL INJURY:
ADDRESSING CONCERNS
Sentencing is complex. So too is the neuroscience of mental harms.
Recognizing these complexities, I do not attempt here to develop a fullscale set of guidelines for how mental harms inflicted on crime victims
should be translated into sentencing enhancements. Moreover, I do not
advocate here for any particular level of enhancement or any particular
sentencing philosophy. Rather, I suggest a general way forward that is
consistent both with the consensus that substance dualism is not tenable,
and with the lack of consensus about the exact nature of the mind-brainbehavior relationship. In short, I recommend cautious change.
Other legal scholars have advocated for more revolutionary
transformation. For example, law professors Dov Fox and Alex Stein
argue that “dualism’s pernicious influence should be uprooted by
devising policies and rules that cast off its distorting metaphysics,” and
in its place should be the author’s suggested “new understanding of
mind and body as conceptually and normatively intertwined.” 86 They
further argue that courts and legislatures should “expel dualism from
our doctrine in favor of this integrated vision of the ways in which
people think and act.” 87 The problem, at present, is that we do not have
sufficient understanding of how the mind and brain are “integrated”
(and if “integrated” is even the best word to describe their relationship).
The best path forward is thus a middle-ground approach, sensitive to the
issues that I lay out below.
It is important to acknowledge as well the stigma of mental injuries
and illness. Dualism in theory need not imply different and unequal.
But in practice there remains a social belief that mental and physical
injuries are not only different—but that “physical” injuries are more
“real” and more deserving of compensation. 88 Campaigns have been
As we stated in Boone, we can offer no “bright line” rule to determine categorically
when the acts of a defendant cause mental damage sufficient to support a finding of
serious injury. In the context of the felonious assault statute, we have long held that
the seriousness of the injury inflicted “must be determined according to the particular
facts of each case.” The same rule must apply in cases where the serious injury caused
by the assault is mental in nature.
Id. (citations omitted).
86. Fox & Stein, supra note 1, at 5.
87. Id. at 33.
88. See Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: An
Empirical Look at the Impact of Mental Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47,
51 (2005) (footnote omitted) (“Although individuals with physical impairments have also been
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underway for decades to reduce the effects of this stigma. 89
It is the combination of the dualist distinction, plus the stigma
attached (by others, not the dualist theorists themselves), that makes the
dualism debate relevant to criminal sentencing. For instance, one
solution might be for the law to jettison entirely the bodily and mental
categories, and to consider simply “injury” or “serious injury” as a
catch-all. 90 If the law adopted this approach, the dualism debate might
be irrelevant because all alleged injuries—whether labeled by a dualist
as “mental” or “physical”—would be potentially considered for purpose
of sentencing enhancement. But the distinction would still matter if (as
in current practice) those injuries considered “mental” were
considered—but afforded less weight. The philosophical and scientific
debates over dualism do not necessitate such treatment of mental
injuries—but the practical reality is that the label carries weight.91
While an alternative path forward would be to eliminate the
bodily/mental distinction in law and reduce the stigma, I proceed in this
Part under the assumption that—at least for now—the statutory
distinction will persist. Given the qualifier “bodily” in bodily injury
sentencing enhancements, how should courts interpret it?
A. The DSM as a Guide
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”),
published by the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”), is now in
its fifth edition (“DSM-V”). 92 The DSM is the primary guide for the
diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders in the United States, and
consequently has been tremendously important to the law. 93 A brief
the subject of disparaging public opinion, the animus directed at psychiatric impairments is
proportionately greater and more pervasive.”).
89. Shen, supra note 1, at 2061.
90. I have raised this as a possibility previously. See id. at 2105.
91. See Hensel & Jones, supra note 88, at 51 (“The unemployment rate of individuals with
mental illness continues to be ‘three to five times higher than among those with no psychiatric
disorder.’”).
92. The DSM was described in 1994 by a New York Times article as the “bible” of the
psychiatric profession. Daniel Goleman, SCIENTIST AT WORK: Allen J. Frances; Revamping
Psychiatrists’ Bible, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/19/science/
scientist-at-work-allen-j-frances-revamping-psychiatrists-bible.html. Courts and commentators
now routinely describe the DSM as the diagnostic bible. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, No.
S192 Cr. 455 (CSH), 1994 WL 683429, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1994) (citing Goleman’s article);
Rebecca A. Johnson, “Pure” Science and “Impure” Influences: The DSM at a Scientific and
Social Crossroads, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 149 (2013) (calling the DSM “the
proverbial ‘bible’ of mental illness”).
93. See Douglas A. Hass, Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause You
Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 and Employment Law, 44 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 683, 692 (2013) (footnotes omitted) (“Courts, legislators, and government agencies have
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review of the development of the DSM, with respect to its discussion of
the relationship between the brain and mental disorders, is instructive
for thinking about the path forward for mental injury and criminal
sentencing enhancements. 94
In 1952, when the APA published the first edition of the DSM, a
distinction was made between “diseases caused by or associated with
impairment of brain tissue function” and “disorders of psychogenic
origin or without clearly defined physical cause or structural change in
the brain.” 95 Four decades later, in 1994, when the fourth edition of the
DSM was published, the APA officially rejected the
“organic”/”inorganic” classification scheme. 96 In the DSM-IV, the
APA explained that “[t]he term ‘organic mental disorder’ is no longer
used in DSM-IV because it incorrectly implies that the other mental
disorders in the manual do not have a biological basis.” 97 The DSM
also explained why it retained the word “mental” despite recognition of
the biological aspects of mental disorders:

relied on the DSM-IV as a persuasive text in a range of cases implicating mental illness, from
employment discrimination, to criminal law and Social Security disability, and even to health
plan administration. Courts have referred to the DSM as a ‘nationally recognized directory of
mental illness,’ a ‘reliable text,’ and ‘specialized literature’ with a rigorous process for including
mental illnesses.”). I focus in this Article exclusively on American courts and the DSM. It would
be worthwhile, however, to expand the investigation to examine the use of the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD) in cross-national contexts. See Robert L. Spitzer & Paul T.
Wilson, A Guide to the American Psychiatric Association’s New Diagnostic Nomenclature, 124
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1619, 1619 (1968) (“Beginning before the turn of [twentieth] century, there
has been growing interest in developing an international classification of diseases to facilitate
communication across national boundaries.”).
94. For more extensive treatments of the history of the DSM, see generally Gerald N. Grob,
Origin of DSM-I: A Study in Appearance and Reality, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 421 (1991);
Johnson, supra note 92; James L. Sanders, A Distinct Language and a Historic Pendulum: The
Evolution of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 25 ARCHIVES OF
PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 394 (2011); Marcia Angell, The Epidemic of Mental Illness: Why?, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, June 23, 2011, at 20; Marcia Angell, The Illusions of Psychiatry, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, July 14, 2011, at 20; DSM: History of the Manual, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm/dsm-history-of-the-manual (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
95. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 5 (1st ed., 1952)
96. Psychiatrists had been calling for a change to this terminology for some time. There had
been many calls for an end to this distinction. E.g., Robert L. Spitzer, et al., Now is the Time to
Retire the Term “Organic Mental Disorders,” 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 240 (1992). Spitzer and
his colleague open their article with this epigraph: “The antithesis between ‘organic’ and
‘functional’ disease still lingers at the bedside and in medical literature, though it is transparently
false and has been abandoned long since by all contemplative minds.” Id. at 240 (quoting S. A.
K. Wilson, discoverer of Wilson’s disease).
97. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 10 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR].
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Although this volume is titled the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, the term mental disorder unfortunately implies a
distinction between “mental” disorders and “physical” disorders that is
a reductionistic anachronism of mind/body dualism. A compelling
literature documents that there is much “physical” in “mental”
disorders and much “mental” in “physical” disorders. The problem
raised by the term “mental” disorders has been much clearer than its
solution, and, unfortunately, the term persists in the title of DSM-IV
because we have not found an appropriate substitute. 98

With the DSM-IV firmly rejecting dualism, and with cognitive
neuroscience research advancing, there was some thought that the
DSM-V might introduce brain biomarkers to diagnose mental
disorders. 99 Such hopes, however, were not realized. 100 Allen Frances,
who served as Chair of the DSM-IV Task Force, put it bluntly: “the
disappointing conclusion . . . was that there are no biological markers
even remotely ready for inclusion in DSM-V.” 101
Why was progress slower than (some) expected?
Harvard
psychiatrist Steve Hyman, a former director of the U.S. National
Institute of Mental Health, reminds us that:
The substantial gaps in our knowledge of the neurobiology that
underlies mental disorders derive in large part from the difficulty of
characterizing the circuitry and mechanisms that underlie higher brain
function, the complexity of the genetic and developmental
underpinnings of normal and abnormal behavioural variation, and the
unsatisfactory nature of current animal models of mental disorders. 102

The challenge of integrating neuroscience more directly into the
DSM-V is a different version of the same dilemma that I identified
earlier for law: we know that mental phenomena are in part physical

98. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS xxi (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
99. See Allen Frances, Whither DSM–V?, 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 391, 391 (2009) (“Well
before the formal start of work on DSM-V in 2007, the American Psychiatric Association, with
support from the National Institute of Mental Health, attempted to develop a research agenda that
would support the development of a classification system in psychiatry based on biological
markers.”); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR DSM-V (David J.
Kupfer et al. eds., 2002) (discussing new approaches that can improve the validity of diagnoses in
preparation for the start of the DSM-V).
100. See, e.g., David J. Kupfer & Darrel A. Regier, Neuroscience, Clinical Evidence, and the
Future of Psychiatric Classification in DSM-5, 168 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 672, 672 (2011) (“In A
Research Agenda for DSM-V (1), we anticipated that these emerging diagnostic and treatment
advances would impact the diagnosis and classification of mental disorders faster than what has
actually occurred.”).
101. Frances, supra note 99, at 391.
102. Steven E. Hyman, Can Neuroscience Be Integrated into the DSM-V?, 8 NATURE
REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 725, 725 (2007).
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phenomena, but we do not yet know exactly how. As a result, it is
unclear how to proceed. Our previous ways (of substance dualism) are
no longer satisfactory—but the present alternatives also seem to be
lacking. So how to move forward? Hyman’s recommendations for the
DSM are instructive in this context as well:
[I]t will be important to avoid premature inclusion of genetic or
neurobiological findings in the DSM, no matter how interesting they
are, if they are not adequately replicated or if their relationship to
behavioural or disease phenotypes cannot be established with clarity.
At the same time, a slavish adherence to the current classification
system would impede progress in research that is investigating the
aetiology of mental disorders and identifying new treatments for
them. . . .
It is probably premature to bring neurobiology into the formal
classification of mental disorders that will form the core of the DSMV. However, it is not too early to use neurobiology as a central tool to
rethink the current approach to mental disorders . . . 103

For law, it will be important to avoid premature integration of
neuroscience into determinations of crime victims’ psychological
harms. But we should also avoid a slavish adherence to old legal
doctrine. Moreover, it is not too early to be inspired by neuroscience
and to see crime victims’ psychological injuries in a new light.
Cognitive neuroscience applied to the experiences of crime victims
reorients us to focus not on the “type” of harm (“physical” or “mental”),
but rather on the severity of the harm and the extent to which the harm
was caused by the offender.
B. Proving Psychological Harm
Defining and diagnosing mental disorders is fraught with difficulty.
Moreover, there is the always-present possibility of malingering. 104 We
also know from case law in the civil contexts that proving mental harm
in court is exceedingly difficult. 105

103. Id. at 729, 731.
104. See Eric Y. Drogin, “When I Said That I Was Lying, I Might Have Been Lying”: The
Phenomenon of Psychological Malingering, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 711,
711–13 (2001) (defining “malingering” and discussing its use for defendants).
105. See, e.g., Keohane v. Stewart, 882 P.2d 1293, 1305 (Colo. 1994) (“Claims for damages
for emotional distress are inherently difficult to prove with certainty, to rebut, and to evaluate.”);
Adam Tucker, A Matter of Fairness How Denying Mental-Mental Claims Frustrates the Central
Purposes of Workers’ Compensation Law, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 467, 467 (2010) (“It is no secret
that American law has been resistant to recognizing the legitimacy of mental injury.”); Dianne J.
Weaver, Claims of Mental and Emotional Injuries and Common Tactics Used to Deflate Them, in
2 ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS, 2 Ann. 2003 ATLA-CLE 1251, 1251
(2003) (“The mental or emotional injuries suffered by plaintiffs are often very debilitating and are
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Given these challenges of assessing mental harms in legal settings,
what is a court to do? 106 Guidance can be found in State v. Arnett, a
2001 Supreme Court of Tennessee case. The defendant in the case was
found guilty of two counts of aggravated rape. 107 On appeal, the court
had to decide whether the “particularly great personal injuries”
enhancement factor could be applied on the basis of a Victim Impact
Statement alone (without accompanying expert testimony about the
victim’s psychological state). 108
The court started by appropriately observing that “[i]t is axiomatic
that enhancement factors may be applied to increase a sentence only if
such factors are established by the evidence.” 109 The defendant argued
that “the ability of a judge, most likely untrained in the field of
psychology, to assess the extent of a victim’s psychological injury
requires the assistance of expert testimony.” 110 But the court rejected
this claim and instead held that “application of this [sentencing
enhancement] factor is appropriate where there is specific and objective

sometimes more consequential than their physical injuries. However, it is often very difficult to
establish that (1) they resulted from the incident underlying the cause of action, and (2) they are
real.”).
106. I focus here on the context of a judge determining whether there is sufficient evidence to
apply a bodily injury sentencing factor. If bodily injury is an element of the substantive crime
itself, then of course it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the normal rules of
evidence and proof apply. For instance, in California, the instruction for Great Bodily Injury is as
follows:
If you find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] ____ [,] [or of
attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]][ or the lesser crime[s] of _____ <insert
name[s] of alleged lesser offense[s]>], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,]
the People have proved the additional allegation that the defendant personally inflicted
great bodily injury on _____ <insert name of injured person> in the commission [or
attempted commission] of that crime. . . . Great bodily injury means significant or
substantial physical injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.
[Committing the crime of ____ <insert sexual offense charged> is not by itself the
infliction of great bodily injury.]
ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 839 (2014).
107. State v. Arnett 49 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tenn. 2001).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 260. The court also explained the Tennessee legislature’s reasoning for the
enhancement:
While we recognize that all victims of crime, certainly victims of rape, must surely
experience mental trauma, we are aware that no two crimes are exactly the same, and
no two victims react to this crime in the same manner. Because some victims may
suffer even more severe emotional trauma than is normally involved with this offense,
our legislature has seen fit to enhance the punishment for those defendants causing
“particularly great” psychological injury.
Id.
110. Id.
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evidence demonstrating how the victim’s mental injury is more serious
or more severe than that which normally results from this offense.” 111
The court went on to state that “[s]uch proof may be presented by the
victim’s own testimony, as well as the testimony of witnesses
acquainted with the victim.” 112
In the case at bar, the court quoted the sentencing judge: the victim
“has had to go through many counselors. She has had to take
medication. She no longer lives a normal lifestyle as she did prior to
[the rape].” 113 In addition, the victim described “how, for over two
years after the crimes occurred, she has needed continuous
psychological counseling and anti-depressant medication to help her
overcome her constant fear of being attacked and to help her function
on a daily basis.” 114 The Supreme Court of Tennessee was satisfied
that the victim’s “discussion of the extensive counseling that she has
undergone, as well as her need for prescription medication, provides
specific and objective evidence of her particularly great psychological
injuries.” 115
The Arnett case was, in my view, rightly decided with one important
caveat. I agree with the proposition that evidence of a crime victim’s
mental injury may include expert testimony and report, but I argue that
such expert evidence should not be a prerequisite to finding the
sentencing enhancement. At the same time, however, I would add the
caveat (which is not inconsistent with the Arnett ruling) that if expert
testimony or other medical information is introduced—whether it
supports the prosecution or defense—it should not be dispositive. This
is consistent with the recognition in the DSM that none of its definitions
of mental disorders “adequately specifies precise boundaries for the
concept of ‘mental disorder.’” 116 If the boundaries of mental disorders
are imprecise, the legally defined boundaries of serious and substantial
injury are even more fluid. The judge should retain discretion to weigh
a variety of evidence from experts and victims, and make a decision in
light of the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 261.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. DSM-IV, supra note 98, at xxi. The DSM also makes clear that there is “no assumption
that all individuals described as having the same mental disorder are alike in all important ways.”
Id. DSM-V notes that “[a]dditional information is usually required beyond that contained in the
DSM-5 diagnostic criteria in order to make legal judgments . . . .” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 20 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter
DSM-V].
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My proposal, I recognize, rests on a combined faith in the sentencing
judge and in those who prepare the presentencing report (“PSR”).117
Further study is needed—and not just for bodily injury enhancement
purposes—of the role that neuroscience may play in the creation of the
PSR. This is because the PSR is “aptly characterized as ‘the single
most important document at both the sentencing and correctional levels
of the criminal process.’” 118 I have focused primarily on judges in this
Article, but it is the combination of judge and courthouse staff (via the
PSR) that matters.
My proposal gives the judge and probation staff much discretion.
One may, quite understandably, be concerned about how that discretion
will be used. For instance, consider the Illinois case of People v.
Burton. 119 The defendant was found guilty of aggravated incest for
having sexual intercourse with his two stepdaughters, ages eight and
nine. 120 The judge increased the defendant’s sentence in light of his
observations that the defendant “obviously injected severe
psychological trauma on the victims, a serious psychological trauma
which may well be carried with them throughout their lives.”121
Notably, the judge’s conclusion about the traumatic effects on the girls
“rested solely upon the judge’s observation of the victims at trial; no
evidence in aggravation was presented at the sentencing hearing
concerning the effect of the offenses on the victims.” 122
The defendant argued that this was an abuse of discretion, but the
appellate court reasoned that:
As a human being experienced in seeing people of all ages testify in
criminal trials, [the judge] acted quite properly in concluding that the
victims’ behavior in court was the result of psychological trauma, not
just nervousness as defendant suggests. A trial judge is in the best
position to evaluate the various circumstances affecting sentencing. 123

Would the appellate court have said the same thing if, purely on its
own observations, the judge had concluded that a crime victim had a
deep bruise, invisible to the naked eye, or a hidden fracture of the leg?
117. Presentencing reports provide for the judge the information required for assigning a
criminal sentence, and typically include a sentencing recommendation. See generally Gabriel J.
Chin, Taking Plea Bargaining Seriously: Reforming Pre-Sentence Reports After Padilla v.
Kentucky, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 61 (2011).
118. Carol Shockley, The Federal Presentence Investigation Report: Postsentence Disclosure
Under the Freedom of Information Act, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 79 (1988).
119. People v. Burton, 429 N.E.2d 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
120. Id. at 545.
121. Id. at 547.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing People v. Cozzi, 416 N.E.2d 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)).
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Increasing the sentencing discretion of judges carries with it the perils
for injustice that have been well recognized. And if we think that
judges will systematically abuse their power in this domain—by
overinflating victims’ psychological harms—then that is a critique to
take seriously.
It is also possible, however, that appellate courts can reign in judges
who go too far in finding mental injury on shaky evidence. 124 For
instance, in a Florida case, Lumpkin v. State, 125 a defendant was found
guilty of robbery and burglary. He was sentenced to a higher-thanrecommended sentence in part because the trial judge found that “the
crime created extreme psychological trauma to the victims and their
family.” 126 The Court of Appeal of Florida reversed, stating that the
record contained “no evidence that the psychological trauma
experienced by the victims was unusually greater than that normally
experienced by the victims of armed robbery, and there was no claim of
any resulting physical manifestations.” 127 The court went on to state
that, “[t]he unsupported comment made in the presentence investigation
by the law enforcement officer that ‘most of the victims are undergoing
psychiatric treatment because of [the robbery]’ did not amount to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the witnesses suffered from
psychological trauma as a result of witnessing the crimes.” 128
C. Causation Conundrums
Neuroscience tells us that mental states are brain states. Thus,
neuroscience tells us that when a crime victim experiences adverse
mental consequences, the victim experiences something physical. But
why does this particular crime victim have this particular mental
experience? Did the offender’s act cause it? Reliably answering these
questions is tremendously difficult for at least three reasons.
First, as has long been discussed in the tort context, it is difficult to
establish a causal relationship between a particular traumatic event and

124. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792 (3d Cir. 1999) (remanding the case to
district court for a more detailed explanation as to basis of five-level upward departure imposed
on the basis of extreme psychological injury); Sarria v. State, 501 So. 2d 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987) (vacating and remanding the sentence to circuit court, as there was no support for its
finding that victim’s psychological trauma was greater than that which usually results from the
same offenses); Thompson v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1046 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that a
prisoner was entitled to resentencing after finding the aggravating circumstances on which trial
court relied inappropriate).
125. 510 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
126. Id. at 1165.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1166.
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the resulting mental and emotional harm. 129 For instance, in their
expansive volume on psychological knowledge in court, Gerald Young
and colleagues ask: “[i]n any individual case, to what degree can
presentation be explained by the gamut of factors unrelated to the
trauma itself?” 130 Many times the answer may be only to a small
degree. 131 In the context of PTSD, “[t]he field has still not evolved to
the point where it can apply the study of [population] risk factors to
individual cases of PTSD in a systematic manner; that is, it is hard to
attribute the ‘PTSD’ of any single person to the presence of any single
risk factor.” 132
Second, we know from scholars in disciplines such as psychology,
psychiatry and public health that a traumatic event is a cause—but not
typically the sole cause—of mental disorders. The onset of major
mental disorders is affected by difficult to measure social factors.133
Consider PTSD. Research confirms what common sense suggests: the
likelihood of onset of a disorder like PTSD after a traumatic event is
affected by the quality of the post-trauma social support. 134 Moreover,
“[t]he psychologist considering issues of causality in a sexual assault
disability evaluation may be challenged by a number of issues.” 135 This
129. See generally John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional
Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789 (2007).
130. PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN COURT: PTSD, PAIN, AND TBI 5 (Gerald Young et al.
eds., 2006) [hereinafter PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN COURT].
131. Id.
132. Gerald Young & Rachel Yehuda, Understanding PTSD: Implications for Court, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN COURT, supra note 130, at 55, 56–57.
133. Crick Lund et al., Social Determinants of Mental Health, in GLOBAL MENTAL HEALTH:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 116 (Vikram Patel et al. eds., 2014). Exactly how social factors relate
to the onset of mental disorders is still under investigation, and “there is a growing international
field of research dedicated to studying the social determinants of mental health . . . .” Id.; see
Carles Muntaner et al., Socioeconomic Position and Major Mental Disorders, 26 EPIDEMIOLOGIC
REV. 53, 53 (2004) (“A number of reviews published in the late 1990s documented the
associations between socioeconomic position (SEP) and specific mental disorders (6–9); in 2003,
a comprehensive meta-analysis of the research on SEP and depression (10) concluded that both
prevalence and incidence studies show that persons of low SEP (i.e., low educational and low
income levels) are at a higher risk of depression.”).
134. See Emily J. Ozer et al., Predictors of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Symptoms in
Adults: A Meta-Analysis, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 52, 54 (2003) (providing statistical analysis on the
onset of disorders such as PTSD and possible correlations with environmental factors of the
patients).
135. Melissa A. Polusny & Paul A. Arbisi, Assessment of Psychological Distress and
Disability After Sexual Assault in Adults, in PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN COURT, supra note
130, at 97, 102. “The task of attributing distress and disability with certainty to only one event
becomes challenging when the individual has a history of exposure to multiple traumatic events
that could potentially lead to the development of a psychiatric condition.” Id. at 104. In the
context of PTSD, “pretrauma, peritraumatic, and posttraumatic factors have emerged as important
in influencing the response to trauma.” Young & Yehuda, supra note 132, at 56.
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is of special concern, given that a number of the cases in which
sentencing enhancement for mental harms has been employed have
involved rape. 136
Third, in the context of “causing” PTSD and other mental trauma, it
can be said that the criminal offender is plausibly an actual cause, but it
can also be argued that, depending on the causation theory one applies,
the offender was not the proximate (legal) cause. Elsewhere in the
criminal law, we typically do not hold offenders liable when we find a
superseding cause. 137 Here, courts that apply the bodily injury
enhancement in the face of mental injuries will need to carefully
consider the causal connection between the offender’s acts and the
victim’s psychological harms. Part of this proximate cause policy
analysis will necessarily involve what a reasonable offender would have
expected the consequences of his actions to be.
In this way, we can distinguish—for purposes of causation analysis—
a sub-optimally functioning brain from a broken leg. When an offender
hits a victim’s leg with a bat and breaks it, we can be reasonably assured
that the offender caused the broken bone. We can also make the
presumption that a reasonable offender knows the risks associated with
such an act.
We cannot credibly make similar assumptions with all mental harms.
Legal scholar Robert Mikos has recognized this issue as an example of
eggshell victim cases. 138 How should we apportion punishment when
an offender does not know a priori whether the victim will have a
particularly adverse reaction to the criminal event? Questions such as
these will become more paramount if sentencing enhancement is more
routinely allowed and encouraged for infliction of mental harms.
D. Mental Injuries and Sentencing Theory
Although not the central aim of this Article, it is useful to consider
whether the recommendation here—for recognition of mental injuries as
part of the bodily injury enhancement—is consistent with leading
punishment theories. There are many varieties of punishment theories,
136. For a review of additional cases, see generally Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation,
Sufficiency of Allegations or Evidence of Victim’s Mental Injury or Emotional Distress to Support
Charge of Aggravated Degree of Rape, Sodomy, or Other Sexual Offense, 44 A.L.R. 5th 651
(1996).
137. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 190 (6th ed. 2012); see Richard
W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425, 1467
(2003) (“Legal responsibility properly extends outward along the chain or net of causation only
insofar as a sufficient relationship is maintained with the foreseeable risks that made the conduct
inconsistent with others’ right to equal freedom.”).
138. Mikos, supra note 2, at 327.
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often in great conflict with one another. 139 The dominant types of
theory are consequentialist (especially utilitarianism), nonconsequentialist (especially retributivism), and hybrid (e.g. expressive)
theories that combine elements of both. 140 In her recent article
exploring the criminalization of infliction of emotional distress, Avlana
Eisenberg asked a similar question and concluded that emotional harm
should lead to criminal liability for utilitarian, retributivist, and
expressive theories of punishment. 141 I agree.
It is logical that, if one wants to consider the bodily injury caused to
the crime victim in the determination of punishment, then mental
injuries should be included. If a likely benefit of the punishment is the
deterrence of a similar crime in the future, and if the value of that
deterrence is in part a function of the injury to be avoided, then we
ought to include the expected reduction in mental injury as part of the
benefit. 142 Likewise, for those who wish to consider victim harms
when punishing according to blameworthiness, why categorically limit
those harms to purely “physical” injuries? For balanced, hybrid
approaches, such as the “limiting retributivist” theory, consideration of
mental harms can help both to set the boundaries of punishment and to
aid in fine-tuning for particular offenders. 143
To be clear, my position is not that there necessarily needs to be a

139. E.g., Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 205 (2003) (“Punishment theories brutalize one
another, staking out turf on principle and refusing to budge from their respective positions. As a
result, the various theoretical camps spend most of their time on three endeavors: demonstrating
the superiority of their approach to criminal sanctioning, subjecting all other theories to harsh
criticism, and repairing the damage done to their own theory from equally severe attacks.”).
140. See id. at 208 (“Punishment theories generally can be separated into a handful of
philosophical camps—consequentialist (or teleological) theories, nonconsequentialist (or
deontological) theories, and mixed (or hybrid) theories that contain both consequentialist and
nonconsequentialist elements.”).
141. See Eisenberg, supra note 75, at 4 (“Utilitarian theory is premised on maximizing
welfare; one reason why limiting physical harm is important is because of its emotional
consequences. Under a retributive theory, morally blameworthy conduct should be punished, and
to knowingly or recklessly inflict emotional harm on another person is morally blameworthy.
And expressive theory prioritizes sending a message of solidarity with victims and rectifying a
moral imbalance, which would favor taking emotional harm seriously and standing by victims of
emotional abuse.”).
142. Note that whether we think the sentencing enhancements will actually deter the future
behavior is a separate question. My point is that if we expect deterrence, the value of that
deterrence ought to include the reduction in both bodily and mental injuries.
143. See RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A
WORKABLE SYSTEM 80–106 (2013) (reviewing various hybrid theories’ reconciliation of
different punishment goals); NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 160–68
(1982) (discussing how mental illness aggravates punishment and how limiting retributivist
theory offers a more nuanced approach).
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bodily injury enhancement. My point is that if there is a bodily injury
enhancement, I see little reason for punishment theory to disallow the
enhancement for the infliction of mental injuries. 144
To further illustrate, I examine one of the most influential works on
harm in the allocation of criminal punishment: a four-volume work by
philosopher Joel Feinberg. 145 Feinberg takes as his starting point the
harm principle. 146 Harm is defined as a setback to “interests,” where
“interests” are those interests that affect another’s welfare.147
Criminalization is appropriate where there is a setback to interest and
some “wrongfulness” (i.e. violation of another’s rights that is not
justified). 148 My argument here is that, in some instances, mental
injuries should count as harms that involve setbacks to welfare interests.
Although Feinberg does not discuss this issue directly, my proposal
would likely be consistent with his approach. Feinberg recognizes that
“[n]ot everything that we dislike or resent, and wish to avoid, is harmful
to us.” 149 In listing examples of such unpleasant, but not “harmful”
experiences, Feinberg includes unhappy mental states such as
disappointment, hurt feelings, and shame. 150 But he also includes
physical pain “at a readily tolerable level,” and bodily discomfort,
amongst others. 151 Thus, Feinberg’s principle for line drawing is not

144. It should be acknowledged that my cursory investigation here is not definitive. I would
be very pleased to see a philosopher do the question justice in a longer treatment.
145. This builds on a discussion of mine in Shen, supra note 1, at 2110. See generally 1 JOEL
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS (1984) [hereinafter
FEINBERG, 1984]; 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO
OTHERS (1985); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF
(1986); 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS
WRONGDOING (1988). Feinberg’s treatment of Mill’s harm principle has been described as “the
most extensive and influential analysis.” Frederick Schauer, On the Relation Between Chapters
One and Two of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 571, 574 n.15 (2011). For a
critique of Feinberg’s harm principle, see R. A. Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
13 (2001) (critiquing Feinberg’s Harm Principle).
146. FEINBERG, 1984, supra note 145, at 36 (“[T]he harm principle as a guide to the moral
limits of the criminal law does not license liability for acts that tend to cause only nonharmful
wrongs. It is more obvious still that no plausibly interpreted harm principle could support the
prohibition of actions that cause harms without violating rights, for example setbacks to interests
incurred in legitimate competitions, or harms to the risk of which the ‘victim’ freely consented.
The sense of ‘harm’ as that term is used in the harm principle must represent the overlap of senses
two and three: only setbacks of interests that are wrongs, and wrongs that are setbacks to
interests, are to count as harms in the appropriate sense.”).
147. Id. at 34.
148. Id. at 36.
149. Id. at 45.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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coterminous with a physical/mental divide. 152
Feinberg later emphasizes that there are legally protected interests,
and that we can think of criminal law as prohibiting certain types of
impairments of interest. He gives as an illustrative example, the case of
a child who was kidnapped but soon rescued. Feinberg notes that we
might say at that time, “‘X was found unharmed,’ the implication being
that X suffered no bodily harm.” 153 We might also later say that “‘X
was not harmed by the experience,’ by which it is at least implied that X
suffered no psychological harm.” 154 Feinberg goes on to note how—
even in this case where no “harm” may have occurred, at least as
defined a certain way—there has been an impairment of the child’s
ability to pursue his welfare interests. 155 For our purposes here, the
important point is that the notion of “interest” is even less constrained
than the categories “bodily” and “psychological.”
Feinberg’s work has not been without criticism. Philosopher Antony
Duff argues, amongst other things, that Feinberg does not go far enough
in identifying those “modes of conduct that deny or radically fail to
respect the humanity of those against or on whom they are
perpetrated.” 156 Duff’s proposed alternatives to Feinberg’s theory
152. That said, Feinberg writes at times with a physical/mental distinction in mind. He
recognizes that “mental pains” are “hurts” but “only by courtesy of metaphor.” Id. at 46.
Feinberg later addresses the question head on: “whether, in applying the harm principle, we
should permit coercion designed to prevent mental stress merely, when the distress is not likely to
be followed by hurt or harm of any other kind.” Id. at 48. Feinberg’s answer is that:
[T]he hurt is serious enough if and only if it is either a symptom of a prior or
concurrent harm of another order (as a pain in the arm may be the result and sign of a
broken bone) or else it is in itself the cause of a consequential harm (e.g. mental
breakdown) of another order.
Id. Notably, Feinberg’s answer emphasizes the order (i.e. severity) of the harm, not necessarily
the type of harm.
153. Id. at 52.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 52–53.
156. Duff, supra note 145, at 44. Duff explains:
To explain why violations of autonomy should be criminal, even if they do not fall
under the Harm Principle, we must see them as denials of, or serious failures to respect,
the humanity of their victim (or else we cannot understand why autonomy should be so
important). But if we then recognize the inadequacy of a Kantian conception of
humanity, which focuses only on our autonomy as formally rational beings, and
develop a richer conception that does justice to the morally significant aspects of our
nature as social, embodied and impassioned beings, we will see that there are more
ways to deny or radically fail to respect humanity than by violating autonomy. We will
then also see that we therefore have good reason—reason of the same kind as we have
to criminalize violations of autonomy—to criminalize other modes of conduct that
deny or radically fail to respect the humanity of those against or on whom they are
perpetrated.
Id.
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would not touch upon the issue of my central concern: whether
infliction of mental injuries should be categorically excluded when
determining criminal sanctions.
Another critique of Feinberg’s work comes from scholars Andrew
von Hirsch and Nils Jareborg. 157 Von Hirsch and Jareborg have
proposed a “living standard” conception of harm in which punishment
severity considers the reduction in living standard experienced by the
crime victim. Von Hirsch and Jareborg allow for emotional states to be
considered as part of the assessment of whether, and how much, a
victim’s living standard has been reduced by a criminal act. 158
In sum, if one believes that we should use physical injury as a factor
in sentencing, then we have precisely the same reason to allow mental
injury to be a factor. Physical injury is relevant because it is a kind of
harm, and mental injuries can also be harms. Thus, if physical injuries
are relevant, so too are mental injuries.
E. What No Neuroscience Can Do
I have argued that if a criminal sentence can be enhanced on a finding
that the offender caused the victim some level of bodily injury, then
neuroscience gives us very good reason not to exclude mental injuries
from that category of “bodily” injuries. But no neuroscience finding
can tell us whether we should have such a bodily injury enhancement in
the first place. Nor can neuroscience tell us whether that enhancement
should be for an extra hour, day, month, or year in jail. Even if the next
edition of the DSM contains a biomarker for a particular mental
disorder, and even if somehow it can be established that an individual
was the primary cause of that mental disorder, it still has no direct
bearing on whether that individual is guilty of a criminal offense, and if
so, what his sentence should be.
Neuroscience can be (and is) used for normative purposes in law, but
the neuroscientific results themselves are neutral with respect to one’s

157. Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard
Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1991). I cite here from an updated version of the study,
which appears as: ANDREW VON HIRSCH, ANDREW ASHWORTH & NILS JAREBORG, Gauging
Crime Seriousness: A ‘Living Standard’ Conception of Criminal Harm, in PROPORTIONATE
SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 186 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
158. They do recognize, however, a problem similar to the proximate causation issue raised
before. Von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 157, at 23. Von Hirsch and Jareborg write that “[a]
variety of emotional states justifiably flow from being criminally victimized,” but also that
“[o]ther emotional states may flow from criminal victimization, but with less good reason.” Id.
While it’s unclear what counts as a “good” versus a “less good” reason, presumably the analysis
would involve asking whether an offender could have reasonably foreseen the emotional harm
caused by the criminal act. Id.
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aims for the criminal justice system. Scientists can, do, and surely will
continue to inform legal judgments. But demarcating criminal from
non-criminal behavior, and assigning criminal sentences, should remain
in the hands of the law. The goal of neurolaw should be to inform, not
mandate, how democratically elected policymakers, judges, and lawyers
construct and run the justice system. As I describe in the next Part,
neurolaw can improve the information it provides by paying increased
attention to the crime victim’s brain.
IV. NEUROLAW AND THE CRIME VICTIM’S BRAIN
The intersection of brain science, law, and public policy has captured
the imagination of scholars and practitioners. 159 In less than ten years
we have seen the creation of the MacArthur Foundation Research
Network on Law and Neuroscience (2007), 160 the University of
Pennsylvania’s Center for Neuroscience and Society (2009), 161 the
Initiative on Neuroscience and Law: NeuLaw at Baylor College of
Medicine (2009), 162 the Neuroscience and Public Policy Program at the
University of Wisconsin–Madison (2011), 163 the Massachusetts General
Hospital Center for Law, Brain and Behavior (2012), 164 Harvard Law

159. For general introductions to law and neuroscience, see generally OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY
D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2014) (casebook on law and
neuroscience introducing the field); Oliver R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law And Cognitive
Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 61 (2010) (review essay on law and neuroscience); Henry
T. Greely & Anthony D. Wagner, Reference Guide on Neuroscience, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 747 (3d ed. 2011) (guide for judges on issues
related to neuroscientific evidence likely to be proffered in court); Francis X. Shen, The Law and
Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L. J. LEGAL INFO.
352 (2010) (providing a bibliography of publications at the intersection of neuroscience and law); O.
Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1265 (2007) (exploring the use of neuroscientific evidence by capital defendants); Stacey A.
Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship, 7
AM. J. BIOETHICS 44 (2007) (discussing the intersection of law and neuroscience across a variety of
legal domains).
160. MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON LAW & NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.l
awneuro.org/index.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). The Research Network (2011–present) built
upon “Phase I” of the MacArthur Foundation’s investment, the Law and Neuroscience Project
(2007–2011). History: Phase I (2007-2011), MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON
LAW & NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.lawneuro.org/history.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
161. Welcome to the Center for Neuroscience and Society, UNIV. PA. CTR. FOR
NEUROSCIENCE & SOC’Y, http://neuroethics.upenn.edu/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
162. NEULAW.ORG, http://www.neulaw.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
163. Welcome to the Neuroscience & Public Policy Program, UNIV. WISC.–MADISON
NEUROSCIENCE & PUBLIC POL’Y, http://npp.wisc.edu/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
164. MASS. GEN. HOSP. CTR FOR L., BRAIN & BEHAVIOR, http://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/ (last
visited Nov. 14, 2014).
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School’s Project on Law and Applied Neuroscience (2014), 165 and the
Stanford Program in Neuroscience and Society (2014). 166 A large
number of additional centers and institutes have sponsored programs on
neurolaw topics. 167
Other indicators also suggest growth: scholarship at the intersection
of law and neuroscience is increasing rapidly, 168 an increasing number
of students are being exposed to neurolaw, 169 the first Law and
Neuroscience textbook has been published, 170 thousands of judges and
lawyers have been exposed to neuroscience through conferences and
continuing legal education programs, 171 and multiple websites make
neurolaw news available to the interested public. 172
Amidst the flurry of neurolaw activity, much has been made of the
implications of cognitive neuroscience for criminal law. 173 Some
neuroscientists have argued that the criminal justice system should
employ a neurobiological framework and revisit its traditional notions
of blame and punishment. 174 Legal scholars have argued in response

165. This is a partnership between the Massachusetts General Hospital Center for Law, Brain
and Behavior and the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at
Harvard Law School. CLBB and Harvard Law School Announce “Joint Venture in Law and
Neuroscience;” Pain Fellow, MASS. GEN. HOSP. CTR FOR L., BRAIN & BEHAVIOR,
http://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/clbb-and-harvard-law-school-announce-joint-venture-in-law-andneuroscience-pain-fellow/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
166. SPINS – The Stanford Program in Neuroscience and Society, STAN. NEUROSCIENCES
INST.. https://neuroscience.stanford.edu/initiatives/spins-stanford-program-neuroscience-and-soc
iety (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
167. Neurolaw Conferences, MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON LAW &
NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.lawneuro.org/conferences.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
168. See Shen, supra note 159, at 352–53 (discussing the rapid growth of neurolaw and
providing several studies elaborating on this growth).
169. See JONES, SCHALL & SHEN, supra note 159 (the first neurolaw coursebook)
170. Id.
171. The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience: History:
Phase I (2007-2011), VAND. UNIV. SCH. L., http://www.lawneuro.org/history.php (last visited
Nov. 14, 2014).
172. The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience: External
Links, VAND. UNIV. SCH. L., http://www.lawneuro.org/links.php (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
Francis X. Shen, Keeping Up With Neurolaw, 50 COURT REV. 104 (2014) (providing a summary
of neurolaw resources and noting a number of websites disseminating information on law and
neuroscience.)
173. See, e.g., A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (Stephen J. Morse & Adina
L. Roskies eds., 2013); Gideon Yaffe, Neurological Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, in 118
THE HANDBOOK OF CLINICAL NEUROLOGY: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN NEUROLOGY 345
(James L. Bernat & Richard Beresford eds., 2013).
174. See Robert M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1787, 1794 (2004). See generally Joshua Greene & Jonathan
Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS:
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004).
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that neuroscience does not pose such a significant challenge to criminal
responsibility. 175
Examining the criminal offender’s brain, both to explain criminal
behavior and to decide upon appropriate blame and punishment, has
been a focus of both contemporary neurolaw scholarship 176 and earlier
inquiry. 177 In the context of criminal sentencing, scholars have
examined, amongst other things, how brain images affect criminal
sentencing, 178 whether adolescents should be treated differently on
account of their still-developing brains, 179 and how criminal
psychopaths might be different from other criminal offenders. 180
I have noted before that “[d]espite the increased attention to
neuroscience and criminal law, comparatively little scholarship has
examined the possible effects of neuroscientific evidence on our
understanding of the crime victim’s brain.” 181 This remains true

175. See generally Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding Irrational Neurolaw Exuberance: A Plea for
Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV. 837 (2011); Stephen J. Morse, Mental Disorder and Criminal
Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 885 (2011); Stephen J. Morse, Neuroimaging Evidence in
Law: A Plea for Modesty and Relevance, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM
THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 341 (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012); Michael S. Pardo & Dennis
Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211.
176. See, e.g., ADRIAN RAINE, THE ANATOMY OF VIOLENCE: THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF
CRIME (2013); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A Critique of Neuroscience in
Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (2009); Adam B. Shniderman, No Such Thing as a
Sure Thing: Neuroscience, the Insanity Defense, and Sentencing Mitigation, JURY EXPERT, Feb.
2014, at 11; O. Carter Snead, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Future of Punishment, in
CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 130 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin
Wittes eds., 2011).
177. See, e.g., VERNON H. MARK & FRANK R. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN 6, 155
(1970); NICOLE RAFTER, THE CRIMINAL BRAIN 40 (2008). The Los Angeles Times heralded
Mark and Ervin’s book as “the first publication accessible to lay audiences that deals squarely
with the biological basis of violent behavior.” Kenneth Klivington, The Biological Basis of
Violent Behavior, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1970, at Q67. For brief discussion of this history, see
generally Francis X. Shen, Commentary, An Online Symposium on The Anatomy of Violence,
WASH. INDEP. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonindependentreview
ofbooks.com/features/symposium-on-emthe-anatomy-of-violence-em-by-adrian-raine
178. Michael J. Saks et al., The Impact of Neuroimages in the Sentencing Phase of Capital
Trials, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 105, 122–26 (2014).
179. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain
Research and the Law, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 158, 158–61 (2013);
Alexandra O. Cohen & B.J. Casey, Rewiring Juvenile Justice: The Intersection of Developmental
Neuroscience and Legal Policy, 18 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 63, 63–65 (2014); Kevin W.
Saunders, The Role of Science in the Supreme Court’s Limitations on Juvenile Punishment, 46
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 339, 359–67 (2013).
180. Nathaniel E. Anderson & Kent A. Kiehl, Functional Neuroimaging and Psychopathy, in
HANDBOOK ON PSYCHOPATHY AND LAW 131, 131 (Kent A. Kiehl & Walter P. SinnottArmstrong eds., 2013).
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There is, however, much room for integration with
scholarship in the civil context. Scholars have examined neuroscience
and tort law, with attention paid to both emotional and mental harms. 183
Scholars have also examined the legal implications of the neuroscience
of pain. 184 Further, brain-injury lawyers have developed robust and
productive relationships with the medical community, and regularly
integrate neuroscience when they make the case for their injured
clients. 185 Neuroscience has also been used in insurance claims, to
argue that mental illness is indeed physical (and thus should be covered
by the insurance policy). 186
Given this constellation of practice and scholarship—with a primary
focus on the victim’s harms in tort law and insurance law, and a primary
focus on the offender’s brain in criminal law—more synergy seems
valuable. For criminal law, additional attention to the crime victim’s

182. I am unfamiliar of anything published recently that fills this gap. In 2011, I speculated
that “one future possibility is that neuroscience offers us more effective ways to communicate the
long-lasting and often-devastating effects of crime on the brains of crime ‘victims.’” Francis X.
Shen, Law and Neuroscience: Possibilities for Prosecutors, 33 CDAA PROSECUTOR’S BRIEF 17,
23 n.41 (2011). But, I have yet to see evidence of this happening.
183. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort
Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 235 (2012); Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law: Rethinking the
American Approach to Freestanding Emotional Distress Claims, in LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE:
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 203 (Michael Freeman ed., 2010); Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience,
Emotional Harm, and Emotional Distress Tort Claims, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICS 65 (2007); Francis X.
Shen, Monetizing Memory Science: Neuroscience and the Future of PTSD Litigation, in
MEMORY AND LAW 325 (Lynn Nadel & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 2013); Shaun Cassin,
Comment, Eggshell Minds and Invisible Injuries: Can Neuroscience Challenge Longstanding
Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 929 (2013); Roland Nadler, To Heal or Not to
Heal? Towards A Neuroethical Mitigation Doctrine in Tort Law 1 (2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
184. See, e.g., Howard Fields, Can Neuroscience Identify Pain?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO
NEUROSCIENCE 32 (2010); Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective
Experience, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 433 (2007); Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the
Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain
Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801 (2012); Amanda
C. Pustilnik, Painful Disparities, Painful Realities (U. Md. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 2014-18,
2014), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2449
&context=fac_pubs.
185. See, e.g., Robert P. Granacher, Commentary: Applications of Functional Neuroimaging
to Civil Litigation of Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 323 (2008);
Robert P. Granacher, Jr., Traumatic Brain Injury, in NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY:
FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 43 (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012); Shana De Caro &
Michael V. Kaplen, Traumatic Brain Injury: Detecting, Defining, Litigating, N.Y. L.J., July 28,
2011, at 4, 4; Donald J. Nolan & Tressa A. Pankovits, High-Tech Proof in Brain Injury Cases:
New Developments in Biomechanical Animation and Brain Imaging Can Help Jurors ‘See’ the
Damage Caused by Head Trauma, TRIAL, June 1, 2005, at 26, 27.
186. Tovino, All Illnesses Are (Not) Created Equal, supra note 1, at 31–35.
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brain will allow the law to better address the causation, evidentiary and
related normative issues sketched out in this Article. Neuroscience can
be harnessed to inform the legal assessments of both offenders and
victims in the criminal and civil justice systems. 187
CONCLUSION
DSM-V describes itself as “a ‘living document,’ adaptable to future
discoveries in neurobiology.” 188 If criminal sentencing is to be
adaptable to future neuroscientific discoveries, attention must be paid
both to the neuroscience underlying criminal behavior and to the focus
of this Article: neuroscience that may one day explain the varied, and
sometimes devastating, psychological consequences of crime
victimization. This Article argues that when calculating the optimal
punishment based on victim harm, there is no scientifically justifiable
reason to categorically exclude mental harm from the equation. The
Article also argues, however, that these types of brain injuries should be
treated differently, with special attention paid to causation and
evidentiary issues. In short, the criminal justice system should treat
mental injuries for what they are: brain injuries. Injuries to the brain are
physical and often exceedingly complex. Sentencing enhancement
policies should reflect both realities.

187. Neuroscience can also help us to learn about the legal decision-makers in these systems.
For an excellent example of this type of work, see, e.g., MORRIS B. HOFFMAN, THE PUNISHER’S
BRAIN: THE EVOLUTION OF JUDGE AND JURY (2014) (exploring the psychology and neuroscience
of legal actors responsible for the punishment of criminals).
188. DSM-V, supra note 116, at 13.

